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THE DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES IN 
MUGHAL SOUTH ASIA, 1608-1717* 
 
GUIDO VAN MEERSBERGEN 
University of Warwick 
 
ABSTRACT. This article presents the first survey of the full range of diplomatic interactions 
between the Mughal Empire and the English and Dutch East India Companies (EIC and 
VOC) in the period 1608-1717. It proposes a typology of the six different modes of diplomacy 
practiced by the EIC and VOC as a means to better understand the distinct nature of 
corporate diplomacy. Moving its focus beyond exceptional embassies, this article 
demonstrates that by far the most common forms of Company diplomatic activity consisted of 
low-profile petitioning at the imperial centre and ongoing political interactions with 
provincial and local power-holders. It draws on circa fifty distinct episodes to chart how 
Dutch and English diplomatic repertoires in South Asia took shape in response to local 
demands and conventions. Both Companies petitioned Mughal emperors in much the same 
way as Indian subjects did, and both relied on Mughal patrons to do so. Cast in the role of 
supplicants seeking imperial favour and protection, Company-envoys presented themselves 
as obliging participants in the ceremonial performance of an asymmetrical relationship. By 
tying commercial privileges to expectations of submission and service, the imperial 
government proceeded to incorporate these foreign actors into a domestic political 
framework. 
 
In the literature on early modern global interactions, few episodes have received more 
sustained attention than the diplomatic encounter between Nur-ud-Din Muhammad Jahangir 
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(1569-1627), fourth emperor of the Mughal dynasty in India (r. 1605-27), and the Jacobean 
courtier and royal ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe (c. 1581-1644).1 Over time, this first English 
embassy to India has come to signify many different things to many different readers – its 
meanings hotly contested, yet its centrality to early modern Asian-European contacts virtually 
unquestioned.2 Whilst providing fertile ground for key debates in global history, the enduring 
scholarly fascination with Roe’s reception at Jahangir’s court has served to privilege this 
unique encounter over many other, less well-known but far more representative, encounters. 
As such, the focus on Roe’s embassy has severely limited our understanding of European 
diplomacy in Mughal South Asia as a whole.3 This article seeks to redress the 
historiographical imbalance by providing the first survey of the full range of diplomatic 
relations between the Mughal state and the two leading European commercial enterprises in 
seventeenth-century Asia, the English and Dutch East India Companies (EIC and VOC). It 
studies these organisations in conjunction to bring out correspondences between English and 
Dutch diplomatic activities in Mughal domains, and by doing so traces the outlines of a 
distinct type of East India Company diplomacy. 
As a royal mission aimed at brokering ‘Articles of treaty on equall tearmes’ between 
the English and Mughal sovereigns, Roe’s embassy (1615-19) was far from successful.4 
However, as a seminal text from the opening phase of Anglo-Indian encounters, the journal 
Roe kept during his stay at Jahangir’s court has turned into a classic reference point for 
historians and literary critics interested in early modern global connections, cross-cultural 
communication, and early Orientalism. As manifestations of England’s first ambitious foray 
into India, Roe’s mission and writings have been seen to exemplify early English imperial 
desire as well as England’s marginal place in seventeenth-century Asia.5 It has also inspired 
arguments about the presumed incommensurability of European and Indian court cultures, as 
well as about the relative success of cross-cultural understanding and cultural translation.6 
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These are foundational debates which have expanded the critical vocabulary of diplomatic 
history in general.7 Even so, as a testing ground for the meta-narratives that have been 
constructed partly on its basis, Roe’s mission is both limited in scope and problematic in 
nature. When set against the entire range of East India Company diplomacy, it becomes 
apparent that not just the ambassador’s unyielding engagement with the Mughal diplomatic 
world, but the very form of his embassy was atypical. Cut down to size, Roe’s mission stands 
out mainly for highlighting the differences between royal diplomacy on the one hand, and the 
Companies’ customary modes of political representation on the other. 
 An important reason for the disproportionate weight given to Roe’s mission is the 
paucity of available research on the forms of low-profile diplomacy practiced by English and 
Dutch representatives at the various levels of the Mughal imperial administration.8 Save for 
Richmond Barbour’s article on English emissaries preceding Roe at Jahangir’s court, Miles 
Ogborn’s chapter on James I’s royal letters, and discussions of Sir William Norris’s embassy 
(1699-1702) by Harihar Das and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, the treatment of English diplomatic 
activity in South Asia prior to the mid-eighteenth century has been limited to brief comments 
in standard works.9 Indicative is that a recent overview of ‘Diplomacy in India, 1526-1858’ is 
almost exclusively concerned with the 1750s onwards, leaving readers interested in EIC 
diplomacy in the long century following Roe’s embassy chiefly dependent on archival 
publications by William Foster and others.10 Research on VOC diplomacy has been more 
abundant, particularly in recent years.11 Nevertheless, with the exception of two essays on 
Joannes Bacherus and scattered remarks concerning Dutch representatives at the court of 
Shah Jahan (r. 1628-57), analyses of Dutch diplomatic activity in the Mughal Empire have 
only focused on the two best-known instances: the splendid embassies of Dircq van 
Adrichem (1662) and Joan Josua Ketelaar (1711-13).12 Above all, very few attempts have 
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been made to situate these exceptional moments within the longer history of political 
interactions between the Companies and the Mughal government.13 
 By doing just that, this article hopes to demonstrate that it was not the sporadic dispatch 
of stately missions, but periodic low-profile representations at the imperial centre combined 
with continuous political exchanges and negotiations with local and regional power-holders, 
that constituted the norm in early modern Mughal-European diplomacy. Based on circa fifty 
distinct diplomatic events – comprising all known Dutch and English representations at the 
imperial court from 1608 to 1717, plus a representative sample from the much larger set of 
negotiations at sub-imperial levels – this article charts how Dutch and English Company 
agents, Mughal noblemen, Indian brokers, and other intermediaries used a diverse range of 
formal and informal approaches to insert the newcomers into the Mughal political landscape. 
The combined evidence from dozens of diplomatic episodes – many of which have not been 
studied before – conclusively dispels the notion that Mughal-European exchanges were 
hampered by the so-called “incommensurability” of diplomatic cultures.14 It shows that the 
Companies’ diplomatic activities effectively took shape in Asia in response to local 
conditions, conflicts, and conventions. And it decisively shifts the perspective towards 
Mughal agency and the successful efforts by the imperial administration to incorporate the 
Europeans into existing power structures. As such, the present analysis of VOC and EIC 
diplomacy in Agra, Delhi, Surat, and Dhaka helps to bring into view a much clearer image of 
the Companies’ position vis-à-vis the Mughal state. 
 When reviewing Anglo-Mughal and Mughal-Dutch diplomatic interactions from the 
first exchanges in the 1600s down to the last large European embassies to the imperial court 
during the 1710s, what stands out is their degree of variety. To be sure, between the 
magnificent deputations to imperial capitals involving hundreds of attendants, and the plain 
petitioning of a single Company agent at a provincial court, several key features were shared, 
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most evidently their soliciting the imperial government for commercial privileges, legal 
protection, and extra-territorial rights. This shared focus on negotiating the legal status and 
trading rights of foreign communities within the Mughal imperial framework enables us to 
think of this divergent range of practices as representing different modes of a single 
diplomatic repertoire. That said, in order to better appreciate the subtly different emphases of 
these various styles of operating, this article proposes a typology of six modes of diplomacy 
as practiced by the EIC and VOC in Mughal South Asia: 1) the sending of royal 
ambassadors; 2) the dispatch of high-profile embassies headed by Company officials; 3) 
small-scale petitioning at the central court; 4) the commissioning of Indian brokers; 5) 
provincial diplomacy; and 6) local diplomacy. Each mode will be discussed below with 
reference to several representative examples, prefaced by a brief outline of the general 
features of East India Company diplomacy. 
 
I 
Chartered trading companies played a fundamental role in early modern diplomatic 
exchanges, most evidently in relations between Europeans and non-Europeans.15 Whilst their 
importance is increasingly noted as a result of the growing interest in the participation of 
‘non-state’ and ‘sub-state’ actors in inter-polity relations, the specific nature of corporate 
diplomacy has so far remained underexplored.16 Recent scholarship has recognized that 
modern definitions of diplomacy as the conduct of relations between territorially-bounded 
sovereign states are unsuited to understanding the pluriform landscape of early modern 
political entities engaged in cross-border exchanges.17 A period in which the rules and 
boundaries of diplomacy were far from stable or universally agreed, the early modern world 
was also characterized by imperial formations within which ‘the line between internal 
supplication and foreign relations is difficult, if [not] impossible to draw.’18 Indeed, as is 
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best-documented in the Ottoman context, rights of political representation on behalf of 
external powers (that is, diplomatic duties) were frequently invested in officials (consuls, 
bailos, or directors of trading factories) who doubled as heads of small ethnic communities of 
resident foreign merchants seen by their host states as ‘one of myriad communities…living 
within the polity’.19 Hence, just as scholars regard English and Dutch diplomacy in Istanbul 
in terms of lobbying the Ottoman authorities for commercial freedoms and legal protection, 
this article refers to EIC and VOC diplomacy in Mughal India as those political interactions 
aimed at setting the parameters for, and resolving friction arising from, the Companies’ 
commercial presence in Mughal domains.20 
 Perhaps the single most defining feature of the diplomatic approaches of the VOC and 
EIC was their adaptability to diverse foreign environments, itself a product of their hybrid 
character as commercial body politics.21 In regions where indigenous authority was 
comparatively weak, such as island Southeast Asia, the VOC’s promises of military 
assistance in exchange for monopoly trading rights formed the pretext for growing territorial 
claims.22 By the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch ‘empire by treaty’ also extended to parts 
of South Asia, particularly the island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the Malabar Coast (Kerala) 
in southern India. A century later, reflecting the EIC’s military ascendancy after the battle of 
Plassey (1757), unequal treaties with local rulers likewise underpinned British imperial 
expansion on the Indian Subcontinent.23 However, throughout the early modern period and in 
most parts of Asia, the situation was very different. From Safavid Iran to Qing China and 
Tokugawa Japan, powerful Asian states consistently forced the European newcomers into 
subordinate positions.24 
 This, too, was facilitated by the hybrid nature of the trading company. ‘Unlike a 
monarchical state’, Philip Stern has pointed out, corporations ‘could modulate between 
positions of deference and defiance’.25 Indeed, in the words of William Pettigrew, ‘a 
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corporation was in a position to submit itself to a foreign state’, and ‘could offer obeisance’ 
or ‘fealty’ to such states as a precondition for receiving much-coveted commercial 
privileges.26 The most manifest case was arguably that of Japan, where the Dutch 
‘deliberately positioned themselves as loyal subordinates intent on taking up their place 
alongside the shogun’s domestic vassals’.27 Such unequal relationships were both expressed 
by and constituted through diplomatic practice. As Rudi Matthee has noted in relation to 
Persia, Company representatives at Asian courts were routinely compelled to partake in 
highly asymmetric rituals that were ‘structured in visions of royal sovereignty, patronage, and 
benevolence mirrored in obligations of deference, subordination and tribute’.28 This 
description applies to Mughal India in equal measure. It was only in the later eighteenth 
century that a ‘Mughal-centred’ system of diplomatic relationships, ceremonies, and 
hierarchies gave way to ‘Company-centred diplomacy’, and even then not without a degree of 
‘mimicking Indo-Persianate diplomacy and culture’.29 Until then, European parties seeking 
advantageous trade had little choice but to acknowledge the emperor’s supreme authority and 
accept being incorporated into the existing configuration of power. 
 What enabled the East India Companies to do so on their own accord was the fact that 
they enjoyed the right to wage war, conclude alliances, or otherwise establish political 
relationships with rulers within their designated area of operations, as set down in successive 
charters granted by their home authorities.30 Hence, with the notable exception of Roe and 
Norris, each of the men who during this period conducted EIC or VOC diplomacy in Mughal 
India was commissioned solely by the Company they served, not the English Crown or the 
Dutch States-General.31 This crucial circumstance allowed these merchant-envoys substantial 
leeway to adjust to the norms and practices of Mughal diplomacy, which practically all of 
them did to a remarkable degree. As foreign merchant communities, the Dutch and English 
derived the right to trade and reside in Mughal domains from a variety of written orders 
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(farmans, nishans, and parwanas) issued by successive Mughal governments. This 
arrangement was framed within a vision of imperial sovereignty, as is evident from the 
wording of decrees. The Dutch traders, a farman by Shah Jahan tells us in the VOC’s 
contemporary translation, ‘enter under my shadow and protection’ and were expected to 
strive ‘obediently and willingly’ towards the well-being of the empire.32 Similar rhetoric is 
found in a number of farmans which Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) issued to the English. ‘Doe 
the King acceptable service and expect a reward’, one of them urged, while a later one stated 
that the EIC had ‘made a most Humble Submissive Petition’, and ‘Sent their Vakkeels 
[agents] to the Heavenly Palace the most illustrious in the world, to get the Royall Favour’.33 
Far from mutually-binding treaties, such documents were unilateral directives from emperors 
to their subordinates, expressing a vertical relationship of protection and vassalage.34 
 The main reason that the Mughal administration was quick to extend its favour was that 
foreign trade generated substantial tax income and a welcome supply of precious metals. In 
addition, the relationships they struck up with the various groups of Europeans enabled them 
to keep a check on the potentially disruptive impact of these armed traders, while seeking to 
benefit from their access to foreign luxury goods and military potential.35 As for the 
Companies, their objectives were to enjoy free access to cotton, silk, indigo, and other 
commodities; obtain exemption from or reductions in customs duties and road tolls; and 
retain the right to try their own people and freely practice their religion.36 The various modes 
of diplomacy they practiced were uniformly geared towards the extension or renewal of such 
privileges, the confirmation of extraterritorial rights, and obtaining redress against high-
handed treatment by Mughal administrators or the non-observance of previous decrees. Cast 
in the role of humble supplicants seeking favourable commands by the courts that received 
them, English and Dutch representatives petitioned Mughal emperors and their viceroys in 
much the same way as the empire’s Indian subjects did. Just how much these conclusions 
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modify received wisdom based on the paradigmatic example of Roe’s embassy becomes clear 
when placing this exceptional mission in context. 
 
II 
Organized by the East India Company and accredited by King James I, England’s first formal 
diplomatic engagement with South Asia was aimed at securing a firm foundation for English 
trade in the Mughal Empire through mutually-binding agreements.37 The unfeasible nature of 
this objective became apparent soon after Roe landed in Surat, and before long his letters 
home featured bitter complaints laying bare the mismatch between English means and 
expectations and the demands and conventions of Mughal imperial culture.38 Instructed to 
uphold James’s honour, Roe’s comportment in India was informed by contemporary 
European diplomatic theory, above all the notion that ambassadors represented their 
sovereign in person.39 This guiding principle underpinned Roe’s persistent protests against 
what he regarded as ‘affronts and slauish Customes’, most famously the symbolic acts of 
submission to imperial authority expected of those attending the Mughal court, manifested in 
ritual prostrations and the donning of honorific robes (khil’at).40 Although he quickly became 
aware that different diplomatic conventions prevailed in the Indo-Persian world, the 
ambassador felt duty-bound to those concepts he shared with his royal master, repeatedly 
insisting on their universality as part of the ‘law of Nations’ when interacting with Mughal 
officials.41 Caught between the conflicting needs of representing his king and furthering the 
interest of a fledgling corporation, Roe was ill-equipped to deal with a ruler who signed 
unilateral commands instead of bilateral treaties; a diplomatic tradition that did not 
acknowledge European standards as universally applicable; and a court whose standards of 
royal largesse made his modest gifts look painfully scant.42 
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 Several of these issues also dogged the only other royal ambassador sent from England 
to the Mughal court, Sir William Norris (c. 1657-1702). Tasked with soliciting fresh farmans 
confirming the right of English subjects to trade and reside in Mughal domains under 
favourable conditions, Norris arrived in India in September 1699 to act on behalf of the so-
called “New” East India Company, founded the previous year to replace the existing or “Old” 
Company although eventually merging with the former in 1708.43 Commissioned by William 
III and carrying the king’s letter to the aged emperor Aurangzeb, Norris acted as a conduit for 
the establishment of ‘Perpetuall Friendship’ and ‘mutuall love’ between two monarchs from 
different ends of Eurasia; a move which paralleled James I’s efforts to fashion a discourse of 
mutuality in his epistolary exchange with Jahangir.44 Further parallels existed in the way both 
Roe and Norris appealed to universal notions. Gesturing towards the Ottoman court to 
support his claim, Roe had sought to convince his Mughal interlocutors that ‘the honnor and 
qualety of an ambassador is not ruled by the customes of England, but the consent of all the 
world’.45 Over eighty years later, Norris likewise invoked the global applicability of the ius 
gentium to protest against what he regarded as a violation of diplomatic immunity, insisting 
that the detainment of one of his servants by the kotwal (chief of police) of Masulipatnam 
constituted ‘a break of ye Law of Nations & ye Infringement of ye privileiges & Imunitys of 
Ambassadours wch was secured all ye world over’.46  
 Even if these particular arguments carried little weight in the Mughal context, it is 
evident that the imperial administration recognized European monarchs as valid diplomatic 
partners and sought to accommodate the differences between their respective diplomatic 
cultures to some degree. Thus, both Jahangir and Aurangzeb authored replies to the royal 
letters received from England, and both reportedly allowed the English ambassadors to do 
reverence after their ‘owne Custome’.47 Most importantly, Aurangzeb’s reception of Norris in 
April 1701 was preceded by detailed negotiations about points of diplomatic ceremony 
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carried out between the ambassador and two of the highest Mughal dignitaries, Asad Khan 
and Ruhullah Khan, the imperial wazir (chief minister) and khan-i-saman (head of the 
imperial household), respectively.48 Insisting on points of European diplomatic protocol, and 
commenting that the Mughals were ‘strangers to all Customes of yt nature in Europe, havinge 
had none of my character here these 100 yeares’, it is clear that both Norris and his 
interlocutors viewed his embassy as qualitatively different from the ongoing political 
interactions between the Mughal state and the EIC’s representatives in India.49 Norris cited 
the precedent of Roe’s reception, and demanded that his rank be acknowledged through the 
highest possible diplomatic honours.50 Conversely, Mughal officials showed interest in 
European politics and courtly customs, quizzing Norris about a range of issues relevant to his 
audience, including whether ambassadors in Europe where allowed to sit in a monarch’s 
presence and keep their hats on.51 
 Whilst the status and formality attached to the office of ambassador limited royal 
envoys in making concessions – as the rigidity regarding protocol displayed by both Roe and 
Norris reveals – the greater prestige connected with royal embassies also induced the 
Mughals to allow greater degrees of reciprocity.52 It are these two aspects that most clearly 
set royal embassies apart from other forms of East India Company diplomacy – not the size 
of embassy trains, the value of diplomatic gifts, or their commercial and political aims. Both 
responses followed from a shared sense that these embassies existed within a global sphere of 
inter-dynastic exchange.53 Yet royal missions were the eye-catching exceptions to the norm. 
As becomes clear when broadening the scope of research, the vast bulk of what constituted 
East India Company diplomacy in Mughal India was concerned not so much with 
representing far-flung sovereigns, but with cultivating relationships of political patronage in 
what was essentially a domestic, South Asian setting. 
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III 
On the face of it, there is very little that unites the diplomatic missions of Marcus Oldenburgh 
(1633) and Joan Josua Ketelaar (1711-13). The first Dutch deputation to the Mughal court 
about which we are reasonably well-informed, Oldenburgh's dispatch to Agra is a typical 
example of the low-key, small-scale petitioning at the imperial centre routinely practiced by 
the VOC.54 Accompanied by just one colleague, Oldenburgh was explicitly instructed not to 
use the high-sounding title of ‘ambassador’, but instead to introduce himself as a 
commissioned agent (expresse gecommitteerde). He was also strictly ordered not to exceed 
his tight budget, whether by extending his retinue, disbursing gifts to courtiers, or by seeking 
to appear in a stately fashion before the emperor.55 How different was the situation when 
Ketelaar made his appearance in Lahore some eight decades later: Ketelaar’s embassy to the 
courts of first Bahadur Shah (r. 1707-12) and then Jahandar Shah (r. 1712-13) was both the 
last and the most splendid of Dutch missions to the central Mughal court. Spanning exactly 
two years, it involved an entourage consisting of forty European staff with their Indian 
servants, and a military escort of well over 200 Indian soldiers.56 The quintessential example 
of high-profile diplomacy carried out under Company auspices, Ketelaar’s embassy carried a 
price tag of 1,201,495 guilders, half of which was spent on gifts. This was the most expensive 
diplomatic mission the VOC ever sent to any Asian ruler.57 Yet these two delegations at 
opposite ends of the spectrum – and the many diplomatic assignments located on the 
continuum between them – had three crucial facets in common. Their common objective was 
to petition the emperor for favourable decrees; they relied on Mughal patronage to do so; and 
they performed symbolic submission to imperial authority in order to achieve their aims. 
 Both Companies opted to fit out long and costly stately missions only when exceptional 
circumstances required the renewal of privileges, and when alternative approaches were 
deemed insufficient. The VOC sent grand hofreizen (court journeys) on three occasions: in 
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1662, when Dirq van Adrichem was sent to congratulate Aurangzeb upon his succession to 
the throne; in 1689, when Joannes Bacherus sought confirmation of Dutch privileges in the 
Deccan upon the Mughal conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda; and in 1711-13, when Ketelaar 
solicited fresh farmans in the wake of Aurangzeb’s death.58 The only similar English 
undertaking was the mission of John Surman (1715-17), sent from Patna to the court of 
Farrukhsiyar (r. 1713-19) in Delhi to secure a farman freeing the EIC from paying customs in 
lieu of a fixed annual sum.59 While Ketelaar’s embassy train had been vast, Surman managed 
to outdo him. Carried in silver palanquins, the ambassador and his second-in-command, the 
Armenian merchant Khwaja Sarhad, were accompanied by 1200 Indian porters and over 500 
Indian footmen. 160 bullock-carts were needed to transport gifts and other goods, and 
twenty-two oxen to tow their guns.60 Together with royal embassies, high-profile Company 
missions provide us with the most detailed available record of English and Dutch diplomacy 
in the Mughal Empire. Yet for all their intrinsic interest, these conspicuous encounters 
represent only the uppermost layer of the wide scope of diplomatic activity which both 
Companies engaged in. 
 Far more common than stately embassies were small-scale representations at the 
imperial court undertaken by one or two Company agent(s) bearing modest gifts. The first 
Company representative acting as merchant-envoy was William Hawkins, who arrived in 
Agra in April 1609 and remained at Jahangir’s court until November 1611.61 Later 
commissions were usually much briefer. Between 1613 and 1615, Paul Canning, Thomas 
Kerridge, and William Edwards successively acted for short stints as royal letter-bearers, 
while Roe left William Biddulph as English procurator (1618-20) in his place, who was in 
turn succeeded ‘in the courts agentshipp’ by Robert Hughes (1621).62 In the years following, 
Robert Young and John Willoughby procured Jahangir’s farman in Lahore (1624), while 
John Bangham acted as the English solicitor at court in the closing years (1625-7) of 
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Jahangir’s reign.63 For later reigns, some details are known regarding Thomas Kerridge’s 
visit to the newly-proclaimed emperor Shah Jahan in December 1627; the dispatch of the 
petitioners John Drake (1636), Henry Bornford (1637), John Turner (1644), and Richard 
Davidge (1650-1) to Shah Jahan’s court in Delhi; Thomas Andrews’ (unauthorized) dealings 
at Aurangzeb’s court (1660); and the low-profile mission of George Weldon and the Jewish 
interpreter Abraham Navarro to Aurangzeb’s Deccan camp in 1689-90.64 In soliciting new 
privileges or lobbying for the redress of perceived wrongs, these Company representatives 
made use of similar channels and procedures as Mughal subjects.65 They implored the 
emperor to discipline his officials, entreated him to grant securities ‘for our free and 
peaceable living and that wee may not bee injured in our persons or estates’, or sought to be 
pardoned for offences committed against his subjects.66 As time progressed, petitions also 
increasingly featured “domestic” political requests such as ‘that his Majesty will be 
graciously pleased as a Mark of his Royall favour to bestow’ revenue collection rights over 
Indian villages.67 Performing a role mirroring that of Indian vakils (agents, attorneys), the 
Companies’ merchant-envoys hence emerge less as actors in foreign relations than as 
spokesmen of interest groups operating within the Mughal imperial system.68 
 Like the EIC, the VOC also regularly made use of small-scale petitioning at the central 
court. The little-known activities of Wouter Heuten (1621), Hendrick Arentsz. Vapour 
(1625), Marcus Oldenburgh (1633), François Timmers (1635), Cornelis Weylandt (1642), 
Nicolaes Verburgh (1646), Wollebrant Geleynssen de Jongh (1637-40), Johan (or Jan) Tack 
(1648, 1650, 1656, and 1660), Joan Berckhout and Tack (1653), and Joannes Bacherus 
(1677), all fit this model.69 These were mostly ad-hoc deputations, organized largely by the 
VOC’s director in Surat with limited involvement of the Governor-General in Batavia. In 
terms of their duration, the amount of gifts they carried, the pomp surrounding them, and the 
total number of people involved, they came nowhere near the impressive dimensions of the 
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stately embassies on which most research has focused. The status of the person in charge also 
tended to be more modest, as both Companies relied chiefly on their agents in Agra for 
political representation at court. Besides time- and cost-efficiency, the employment of agents 
stationed close to the central seat of power carried a further benefit. As exemplified by Tack, 
who spent twenty-seven years in Agra and became fluent in Hindustani (Hindi/Urdu), their 
proximity to the court enabled Company representatives to become closely acquainted with 
the language, culture, and key figures of Mughal political society.70 
 This process of rapprochement worked both ways. Company envoys required the 
backing of influential Mughal courtiers to obtain audiences with the emperor and ensure that 
their petitions were dealt with. Through personal visits, gift-giving, and polite 
correspondence, they actively cultivated relations with their benefactors at court. From the 
perspective of individual Mughal dignitaries, patronage of European traders could serve to 
advance their commercial interests and guarantee a supply of exclusive luxury items for 
personal use or to offer to their superiors, thus helping them raise their profile at court.71 The 
imperial administration also took an official interest in cross-cultural advocacy arrangements. 
Although marked by recurrent tension, these arrangements provided a functional institutional 
provision for dealing with foreign petitioners and tended to be remarkably long-standing. In 
1616, Roe remarked that Asaf Khan, elder brother to Queen Nur Jahan and father of Shah 
Jahan’s wife Mumtaz Mahal, was ‘appoynted sollicitor for our Nation, soe that I can doe 
nothing without him’.72 Twenty years later, Drake’s (unsuccessful) lobby still relied chiefly 
on the intercession of Asaf Khan, whom, notwithstanding several acrimonious disputes, was 
also by the Dutch described as ‘a friend and great advocate (voorstaender) of our nation’.73 
 In other cases, patronage was transmitted along family or factional lines. From the 
1630s through to the 1660s, prominent contacts of the VOC included Asalat Khan, his 
younger brother, Khalillulah Khan, and the former’s sons, Iftikhar Khan and Multafat Khan.74 
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The Company also received ample assistance from Haqiqat Khan, the diwan (fiscal officer) 
of the emperor’s eldest daughter, Jahanara Begum.75 Jahanara’s concern with the Dutch 
stemmed from the fact that, in the mid-seventeenth century, she controlled the revenues of the 
port of Surat, and hence took a direct interest in maritime trade. Besides Haqiqat Khan and 
the princess herself, Jahanara’s former wet nurse, Huri Khanam, also took an active role in 
communications with VOC representatives.76 These examples throw additional light on the 
involvement in Mughal-European diplomacy of women from the imperial harem, best-known 
through the exceptional figure of Juliana Dias da Costa, an influential Portuguese woman at 
the court of Bahadur Shah who acted as the VOC’s patroness during Ketelaar’s mission.77 
These cases also indicate that, even if misgivings about perceived Mughal pride and greed 
remained commonplace, the Companies’ mutually-beneficial contacts with courtly patrons 
helped sustain the larger political relationship despite everyday friction and episodic conflict. 
 As conscious acts of political self-representation by burgeoning Company-states, 
sumptuous embassies by the likes of Ketelaar and Surman reflected a preoccupation with 
status that was subdued during small-scale missions such as those of Drake or Oldenburgh. 
This difference was appreciated by Mughal emperors, for whom the reception of splendid 
foreign deputations added an extra dimension to the courtly spectacle through which they 
expressed their power. Imperial cavalrymen were provided to escort Ketelaar and Surman to 
court, while Van Adrichem was entertained by noblemen along the way and taken to view 
temples, tombs, and pleasure gardens. Most clearly, Jahandar Shah demanded the presence of 
Ketelaar’s European soldiers during his ceremonial entry into Delhi, seeking to add a further 
touch of grandeur to the pageantry staged to inaugurate his short-lived rule.78 Nevertheless, 
unlike the two royal diplomats, Company envoys leading stately missions never sought to 
challenge the central narrative of ceremonial submission to imperial authority. All merchant-
envoys participated in the forms of ritual obeisance (taslim and kurnish) expected at Mughal 
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courtly audiences. They incorporated Persianate forms of honorific address (‘Lord of 
beneficence and Liberalitie’, ‘Potentate of ye World [and] Center of Security’, ‘Emperour of 
ye Earth and of ye Age’, ‘The Divine Shadow of ye holy Prophet Mahomet’) and self-
deprecation (‘ye least of your servants’, ‘like a graine of sand’, ‘kissing ye Floor...w[i]th lipps 
of Respect and obsequiousness’) in their written appeals (arzdasht), and adopted Mughal 
forms of ceremonial offerings of gold and silver coins (nazr).79 Many also expressed their 
appreciation at the signs of distinction received from the emperor and his leading nobles, 
taking pride in receiving ceremonial gifts such as diamond-studded daggers and robes of 
honour.80 In sum, while certainly regarding their compliance as compulsory, the agents who 
represented the EIC or VOC at the Mughal court presented themselves as obliging 
participants in the ceremonial performance of the hierarchical relationship expressed in 
imperial decrees. 
 
IV 
Following Aurangzeb’s departure from Delhi in 1679, the imperial court spent nearly thirty 
years on the move during the emperor’s interminable Deccan campaigns. Aurangzeb’s reign, 
especially its later decades, coincided with a marked drop in diplomatic representations at the 
central court by both Companies, whom now increasingly came to engage in provincial 
diplomacy instead. Yet the declining presence of Dutch and particularly English agents near 
the imperial abode was also partly offset by a growing reliance on the services of 
commissioned brokers. Indian brokers contributed to all forms of Company diplomacy, 
acting as interpreters, scribes, messengers, and assistants in negotiations. Their participation 
was indispensable on account of their superior knowledge of local customs, often extensive 
networks of contacts, and linguistic abilities. However, the VOC and EIC also employed 
Hindu, Muslim, and Armenian vakils as diplomatic agents in their own right, above all at the 
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courts of the Hindu and Muslim rulers in southern India but also regularly at the Mughal 
court. The use of Brahmin mediators in South Indian diplomacy was a means of 
accommodating cultural difference, as they enjoyed freer access to local Hindu elites than 
was allowed to European outsiders.81 While the Companies’ use of Indian diplomatic agents 
in Mughal domains was less extensive, in 1669 the English factors in Surat did argue that to 
prevent extortions from Mughal officials ‘noe way was deemed more suteable and effectuall’ 
than to keep a Hindu vakil ‘constantly at court’.82 
 Such brokers were seen as ideally-suited for handling matters discreetly and in a cost-
effective manner. In 1660, while the Surat factors were mulling over the choice of ‘a 
judicious person to goe up to court to congratulate the new King’, they decided in the 
meantime to dispatch ‘a Bannian, to acquaint King Orange Zeeb with our aggreivances’ 
against the Mughal viceroy of Bengal.83 Seven years later, an Indian agent dispatched to 
Delhi to petition the imperial wazir succeeded in obtaining a farman confirming the reduction 
of customs duties payable by the EIC in Surat.84 And in 1687, the English entrusted the 
weighty business of procuring a farman to their Armenian vakil, Khwaja Abnus, after the 
previous efforts of ‘Mahomed Hurriff the Bengall Vakeil att the Mogulls Camp’ had proved 
ineffective.85 Financial reasons motivated the Madras Council to refrain from sending two of 
their own number to Aurangzeb’s court, just as considerations of costs had prompted the 
Company to decide against sending an English envoy to Delhi in the 1660s.86 Even so, the 
local EIC officials also agreed that Abnus was the right man for the job because he had been 
recommended by the Mughal governor of Golkonda, Mahabat Khan. Acquiring the backing 
of imperial officials was paramount, as the Dutch director and Council in Surat likewise 
concluded in 1700 when desperately seeking to annul the agreement (muchalka) they had 
been forced to sign which held them liable to compensate Indian merchants for losses due to 
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piracy. Citing their brokers’ extensive contacts at court, Hendrick Zwaardecroon and his 
colleagues authorized the brothers Bhagwandas and Raksikadas to conduct the negotiations.87 
 The importance of agents possessing local knowledge when conducting diplomacy in a 
foreign environment was undisputed, yet the question to what extent one should entrust this 
delicate business to outsiders remained a matter of debate. Answers varied according to the 
circumstances of each case, yet always involved considerations of costs, reputation, and trust. 
The latter was connected to the issue of perceived loyalty, which itself was clad in cultural 
assumptions. Although Zwaardecroon chose to rely on Bhagwandas and Raksikadas, he 
noted that there was room to question their professed allegiance ‘when one considers their 
greedy nature, with which all natives, whether provided with money or not, are ordinarily 
impregnated’.88 A Company envoy who expressed a clear-cut preference for employing 
European rather than Indian representatives was Ketelaar. In 1713 he informed the VOC’s 
Governor-General that several Mughal noblemen had recommended him to maintain an agent 
at the imperial court, yet that to appoint a ‘native’ (inlander) he deemed inadvisable: ‘such a 
man at all times would pursue his own advantage more than his masters’ interest, whereas of 
a European Company servant, bound by oath to the Company, one can at all times expect 
more and sincerer services’.89 
V 
The final two modes of diplomacy practiced by the VOC and EIC in Mughal South Asia – 
provincial and local diplomacy – are both the most common and the least studied varieties. 
Political contacts between Company representatives and Mughal officials at the provincial 
and local levels of the imperial administration spanned the range from formal audiences at 
provincial seats of power, to attendance at the courts (darbars) of local officials, and informal 
meetings involving a wide array of Asian and European intermediaries. Extensive diplomatic 
activity in port towns such as Surat or provincial capitals such as Dhaka normally preceded, 
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proceeded in parallel with, or continued beyond, Dutch and English representations at the 
central court. What is more, official and unofficial commercial arrangements frequently 
relied solely on decrees issued at the provincial level, particularly in Bengal where subahdars 
(provincial governors) enjoyed considerable autonomy.90 Diplomatic interactions between 
lower-tier Mughal power-holders and Company agents operating at the district-level hence 
both complemented and reduced the need for central diplomacy. It is by following the 
channels of communication through which agents of both Companies applied themselves to 
their contacts in the imperial administration that the full scope of trans-imperial patronage 
becomes visible.91 Besides offering greater insight in everyday practices of cross-cultural 
diplomacy, a focus on local forms of conflict resolution and political brokerage also 
elucidates how the larger Mughal-European relationship took shape through inter-personal 
interactions in different parts of the empire and in response to conditions on the ground.92 
 There are countless examples that show how deeply central diplomacy was embedded 
in a web of local and provincial relationships. In a typical passage, the English merchants in 
Surat in 1663 noted that a cost-effective alternative to Van Adrichem’s recently-completed 
embassy had been identified: ‘The President made knowne to his Councell that an 
opportunity now presented, by an acquaintance of his in towne who had a brother up at court 
in great credit and respected there by most of the nobles, through whose means there was 
hopes of obtaining the like privilledges that the Dutch had lately graunted them after so vast 
an expence’.93 The scenario was strikingly familiar. In 1677, when commissioning Bacherus 
to proceed to Delhi, the director of Dutch trade in Surat procured a letter of recommendation 
from the local Mughal governor (mutasaddi), Ghiyasuddin Khan, addressed to the latter’s 
brother who was in charge of handling petitions at Aurangzeb’s court. Bacherus also paid a 
visit to the subahdar of Gujarat, Muhammad Amin Khan, to solicit letters of support 
addressed to the imperial wazir and other noblemen.94 Naturally, assistance of this kind had 
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its price, as the Companies’ requests for exemption from customs duties, road tolls, and other 
charges competed with the interests of local merchants and tax collectors. When 
Zwaardecroon was preparing his petition to the imperial court, in June 1700, he spent several 
weeks negotiating with Surat’s mutasaddi, Diyanat Khan, again in order to procure a cover 
letter to an influential brother at court, this time to Arshad Khan who worked as the wazir’s 
deputy. Both parties eventually agreed that the governor would write the letter in return for a 
gift of 1,000 mohurs (gold coins) to himself, 3,000 rupees to his son, and smaller sums to 
several of his staff. Local diplomatic events such as these are particularly revealing of the 
central significance of seemingly minor actors in shaping the course of Mughal-European 
relations. From the dense chain of mediation that shaped the latter case, it was the eunuch of 
Diyanat Khan, a man called Mia Ambar, who emerged as the key mover. Consequently, it 
was Mia Ambar at whom Dutch efforts to obtain political favour were principally directed.95 
 In yet other cases, settlements reached between the Companies and local officials were 
arguably more decisive than their formal authorisation by the central government. When 
Tack’s mission to Shah Jahan’s court in 1648 had not brought the result the VOC desired, the 
Company decided to arrest Mughal shipping in an attempt to obtain redress for a number of 
grievances. This version of gunboat diplomacy proved fruitful, and in September 1649 a list 
of proposed articles was approved by Surat’s mutasaddi, Mir Musa, who wrote to the 
emperor recommending their endorsement.96 A similar deal was brokered at the conclusion of 
the so-called Anglo-Mughal War of 1686-90, when the EIC agents in western India and the 
Mughal governor of Surat agreed that both parties would restore or pay compensation for any 
assets that had been seized. The arrangement had been reached following extensive meetings 
in the summer of 1689 between George Weldon and Abraham Navarro on the English side, 
and Qazi Ibrahim and Mir Nizam on that of Surat.97 Weldon and Navarro’s embassy to 
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Aurangzeb’s court subsequently brought the conflict to a formal close, yet the most crucial 
steps had already been taken through successful local diplomacy. 
 Finally, perhaps the greatest part of provincial diplomacy was geared towards localized 
arrangements and relationships. In the eastern provinces of Orissa and Bengal, early English 
and Dutch diplomatic efforts were aimed at securing trading rights within these respective 
districts, as was the case with Ralph Cartwright’s mission to the provincial court in Cuttack in 
1633, and Jacob Mahuysen’s audience with subahdar Islam Khan in Dhaka in 1636.98 In later 
years, Company representatives most commonly travelled to provincial capitals to complain 
about local officials’ non-compliance with existing privileges and to request fresh decrees, as 
Louis Junius and James Bridgman did when attending Prince Shah Shuja’s court in Rajmahal, 
in 1650 and 1651 respectively.99 Other instances of provincial diplomacy focused on 
welcoming the incoming governor (as with William Blake’s visit to Shaista Khan in 1664); 
settling local disputes (the reason for Pieter Hofmeester’s mission to Dhaka in 1672); or 
maintaining relations through the periodic presentation of gifts (which provincial officials in 
Dhaka, Kasimbazar, Patna and elsewhere expected from the VOC at least once every two 
years).100 Vice versa, Mughal governors summoned Company agents to their presence or 
dispatched messages to them when they sought material or military support. The best-known 
instance is Shaista Khan’s military campaign against Arakan of 1665, for which the viceroy 
demanded men and ships from the Dutch and English. In an unprecedented move, the Mughal 
subahdar even sent two envoys to Batavia to acquire the desired assistance, a unique 
occurrence in a diplomatic relationship characterized by the lack of reciprocal exchange.101 
 Besides differences of scale and degrees of formality, in their ceremonial form 
diplomatic encounters at regional seats of power were analogous to those at the central court. 
Mughal imperial symbols and languages of political authority were used throughout the 
empire, and Mughal princes and high noblemen modelled their personal courts on that of the 
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emperor.102 Consequently, courtly audiences in Bengal and other provincial sites bore the 
usual marks of Mughal sovereignty, including the presentation of nazr and the donning of 
khil’at. That said, the smaller scale at which these interactions played out allowed for greater 
proximity between hosts and visitors. For instance, during his attendance at Shaista Khan’s 
court in Dhaka in 1682, the English agent William Hedges had multiple opportunities to 
directly converse with the subahdar and the provincial diwan.103 Such direct, personal 
contacts between Mughal officials and Company representatives were most common at the 
port town level, where political and social interactions took place on an everyday basis. Local 
diplomacy hence also had a communal side to it, for instance in the form of the banquet 
hosted by the mutasaddi of Surat for ‘all the eminent men in Towne’, at which the Dutch and 
English merchants publicly reconciled their differences with the Mughal harbour-master.104 
From the perspective of the EIC and VOC, to prevent disputes from happening at the local 
level was preferable over the cure of soliciting the emperor.105 The latter option was deemed 
exceedingly costly, but more importantly still, the implementation of imperial decrees 
depended strongly on the cooperation of administrators on the ground. The gradual turn-away 
of both Companies from central diplomacy toward a focus on maintaining functional 
relations with provincial and local power-holders thus also serves as a reminder of the agency 
and autonomy of the latter, who strategically employed their positions of influence to benefit 
from the European presence. 
 
VI 
The study of cross-cultural diplomacy has become one of the most vibrant sub-fields of early 
modern global history. Combining the macro-perspective of inter-polity relations with the 
micro-lens of interpersonal interactions, it has the potential to revise Eurocentric accounts of 
imperial expansion, economic integration, and cultural exchange by foregrounding the 
DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 
24 
 
contributions of a multiplicity of actors from different parts of the world. This article has 
aimed to deepen our understanding of early modern diplomacy by providing the first survey 
of the various forms of diplomatic activity that structured commercial and political relations 
between the Mughal Empire and the two largest East India Companies. By proposing a 
typology of six different modes of diplomacy as practiced by the VOC and EIC, it has sought 
to provide a fuller and more textured account of the distinct nature of Company diplomacy. 
 Unlike what previous studies have suggested on the basis of exceptional cases, Mughal-
European diplomacy was not primarily based on rare but costly embassies, nor was it 
irredeemably hampered by incompatibility between South Asian and European norms and 
practices. From everyday lobbying with port town officials to high-profile missions to the 
central court, the diplomatic activities of English and Dutch merchant-envoys were highly 
responsive to their host environment, as both Companies made use of the forms and channels 
of political petitioning current within Mughal imperial culture. These interactions relied on 
the knowledge, networks, and support of local intermediaries, as well as on the backing of 
high-placed members of the Mughal administration. The site-specific modes of Company 
diplomacy that emerged are thus best seen as forms of political representation operating 
within the constitutional framework of Mughal India. By forcing the European arrivals into 
the role of supplicants dependent on imperial favour and protection, the Mughal government 
was able to exert a degree of control over these disruptive outside elements. Ironically, it was 
its formal incorporation as a Mughal landholder that eventually provided the EIC a much-
needed source of legitimacy for its growing claims to territorial possessions, yet such 
aggressive European expansionism was only possible after the decline of Mughal central 
power had produced a fundamental shift in the balance of power on the Subcontinent.106 
 Although they were the most powerful, the Mughals were certainly not the Companies’ 
only diplomatic partners in early modern South Asia. During the period covered by this 
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article, the EIC and VOC conducted regular diplomatic interactions with a wide range of 
South Asian polities, including the Sultanates of Golkonda and Bijapur, the Marathas, the 
Hindu principalities of Madurai, Thanjavur, and Ramnad, and the Buddhist kingdom of 
Kandy.107 In those cases, too, power differentials affected the nature and shape of diplomatic 
relations, with the Companies least likely to appear accommodative when the power balance 
tipped in their favour. Research on EIC diplomacy outside India is as yet too scarce to allow 
for broader comparisons, yet studies on VOC diplomacy confirm that a tendency to adjust to 
local contexts defined the Dutch approach to diplomacy in Asia more widely. Reflecting on 
VOC embassies to China and Japan, Leonard Blussé has observed that ‘the Dutch had no 
qualms about subjecting themselves to Asian court ritual’, while Carl Fredrik Feddersen’s 
recent study of Dutch relations with Makassar argued that the VOC’s diplomacy was 
characterized by ‘principled pragmatism’.108 It is hoped that this article will contribute to 
comparative analysis of the forms and effects of cross-cultural diplomacy within a global 
framework. Now that it is increasingly becoming apparent just how common it was for 
European actors to adopt local practices when negotiating in a variety of African and Asian 
contexts, future research will need to explore to what extent such practices were carried over 
from one diplomatic context to the next, and how such transfers served to shape the global 
history of diplomacy. 
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